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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
court's decision is based only upon the particular fact situation pre-
sented and the "essence of the marriage contract" rule is not there-
by overruled, does it remain the Wisconsin test, or is some new rule
being promulgated by the court? The court does not specifically
answer the question and necessarily, therefore, leaves it open for
interpretation. In not overturning previous decisions it would seem
that fact situations similar to those previously presented for adju-
dication would remain grounds for the granting or denial of relief
under the rule of stare decisis. Under this rule the court would allow
annulments for misrepresentations as to the presence of a venereal
disease, pregnancy by another, and pregnancy when no pregnancy
exists, and deny annulments for misrepresentation as to religious
belief, age, prior chastity and financial status (the latter being set
out specifically in the principal case). In the same vein it is likely
that any different, new, or distinguisable fact situations may be
adequate grounds for relief under the "but for" rule stated in the
principal case. This analysis envisions the use of two rules, an inher-
ently inconsistent procedure in the law.
It would therefore, be more logical to pick one of the following
interpretations: (1) that when the fraud is deemed material as to
the induced consent the court will adopt the new "but for" rule
and make all previous decisions reviewable, with the possibility
of a denial for public policy reasons; in essence the court would
decide such issues on a case by case basis, or (2) that the "but for"
rule may only be applied to facts similar to those in the instant case
to circumvent a seeming injustice, and the rule that the alleged
fraud must go to the "essence of the marriage contract" remains
the test in Wisconsin.
The most logical conclusion is that the court has now adopted a
two-step plan for deciding these cases. First, the fraud must be
material and, second, if it is material they will apply the new "but
for" rule. The "essence of the marriage contract" rule, pursuant to
this reasoning, must be regarded as overturned, and the fact situa-
tions decided under that rule are reviewable. Due to the qualifica-
tion in the principal case that relief in some fact situations may be
denied on public policy grounds, it seems that the court shall pro-
ceed in this area on a case by case basis, that is, a balancing of the
equities in each instance to determine the just solution for each
problem presented.
EDMUND CHMIELINSKI
Torts-Municipal Corporations-Abolition of the Doctrine of
Immunity: A widow brought an action against the city for the
death of her husband, a mover, resulting from a fall down an elevator
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shaft in a municipally owned building. Walking backwards, carrying
furniture, plaintiff's decedent fell down an allegedly unguarded opening.
The suit was bought on the theory that negligence constituted the prox-
imate cause of the death. At the hearing, the fact that the city was en-
gaged in a governmental rather than a proprietary function was deter-
mined. Consequently, the motion to dismiss made by the city on the
ground that the building where the injury occurred was used solely for
governmental purposes and the city was, therefore, not liable in dam-
ages, was granted by the Circuit Court. From this decision, plaintiff
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Michigan, by an equally divided
court, affirmed as to the case at bar, but by a five-to-three split prospec-
tively overruled the doctrine of immunity of municipal corporations
from tort liability. Thus, Michigan became the latest in the list of states
to overrule this doctrine and follow the general trend toward abolition
or immunities." Williams v. City of Detroit, - Mich.-, 111 N.W.
2d 1 (1961).
Recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Kofis v. Doctor's Hos-
pital,' followed the Michigan Court's decision in Parker v. Port Huron
Hospital,3 and abolished charitable immunity. In doing so, the Wiscon-
sin Court relied heavily on the Michigan Court's language in the Parker
case. Since it has been pointed out that the doctrine of municipal im-
munity is closely related to that of charitable immunity,4 the rationale
of this case may indicate the future of municipal liability in Wisconsin.
The rule, which was adopted by the courts of the country in an era
when many municipal units were small and struggling, was justified on
one or more of the following grounds, all of which have arisen to
plague these same forums when attempting to abolish it. The ancient
theory continues to prevail that the sovereign has immunity from suit
which is extended to the municipality as his representative. This seems
to be the approach followed in Wisconsin.5 A practical explanation has
been advanced in the idea that it is more expedient for individuals to
bear the burden than inconveniencing the public as a whole. Finally, a
public policy argument has been used based on the expectation that gov-
ernmental agents would carry out their functions more effectively when
not precluded by the fear of liability. The volume of legal writing on
the subject, and more recently case law, has developed equally classical
answers. First, immunity from suit does not necesarily belong to a
democratic "sovereign". Second, even public inconvenience does not
' See 60 A.L.R. 2d 1198 (1958).
2 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961) ; Supplemental Opinion, 12 Wis. 2d
367, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
3 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W. 2d 1 (1960).
4 Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109
N.E. 2d 636 (1952).
5 Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
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justify the destruction of individual rights. And, lastly, negligent and
tortious conduct by government should be "hampered"-not encouraged. 6
The evident dissatisfaction with the doctrine has led to some ameli-
orating efforts on the part of both the courts and the legislatures. The
basic judicial effort has been in the division of activities carried on by
governmental bodies into governmental and proprietary; the immunity
from liability extending only to the former.7 The legislatures have recog-
nized the rule's inherent inequitableness by passing statutes removing
certain aspects of municipal operation from its protection. In Wiscon-
sin,8 the statutory exceptions include the Safe Place Statute, 9 Motor
Vehicle Accident Statute,10 Highway Defects Statute," Mob-Riot Sta-
tute,12 and Judgments Against Public Officers Statute. 13
The separate opinion written by Justice Black in the Williams case
points up two basic problems involved in the judicial abrogation of the
doctrine, since
[1] ittle time need be spent in determining whether the strict doc-
trine of municipal immunity from tort liability should be repudi-
ated. All this is old straw. The question is not 'Should we?'; it
is 'How may the body be interred judicially with non-discrim-
inatory last rites?' No longer does any eminent scholar or jurist
attempt justification thereof. All unite in recommendation of cor-
rective legislation.'14
The anomalous result of the case, not wholly supported by seven of
the eight justices, resulted from the divergence of views on the role of
stare decisis and whether immunity should be abrogated prospectively
or retrospectively or by something in-between.
The majority of the court in the Williams case, in the face of
silence on the part of the legislature to the dissatisfaction with the
doctrine previously expressed by the court,'5 rejected the view that
once a rule has become established, it is a problem for the legislature,
inasmuch as any change is the usurpation of a legislative function in
contravention to both the Federal and State Constitutions. Their view
is well summed up in a quote from Mr. Justice Holmes which they
adopt.
6 See the classic exposition by Professor Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925), Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039 (1926-1927).
7 PRossER, ToRTs, 774-780 (2d Ed. 1955).8 See Bernstern, Governmental Tort Liability and Immunity in Wisconsin, 1961
Wis. L. Rzv. 486, for a definitive discussion of the statutes.9 WIS. STAT. §§101.01, 101.06 (1959).
10 Wis. STAT. §345.05(2) (a) (1959).
11 WIs. STAT. §81.15 (1959).
12 WIS. STAT. §66.091 (1959).
13 WIS. STAT. §270.58 (1959).
14Williams v. City of Detroit, - Mich.- , 111 N.W. 2d 1, 10 (1961).




It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.'"
The current status of Wisconsin's law in this area is of considerable
interest. In Britten t. Eau Claire, the Wisconsin Court criticized the
doctrine, but stated the legislature should make the change.
The doctrine that immunity from liability should be granted to
the state and municipalities while engaged in governmental oper-
tions rests upon a weak foundation. Its origin seems to be found
in the ancient and fallacious notion that the king can do no
wrong. The rule is of such long standing and has become so
firmly established as a parcel of Wisconsin's jurisprudence, how-
ever, that we should hesitate to abandon it. We consider that if
it is to be abandoned it is only proper that the request therefor
should be made to the legislature. But we do consider that the
precedent... [lacks] support in both logic and reason .... 17
However, in the Kojis case, the court made this statement which
seems to indicate the view they would take of the argument against
judicial abrogation.
The defendant insists that if the rule be changed it should be
done by the legislature and not by the court. This is upon the
theory that questions of public policy are to be determined by
the legislature. If that were strictly true then perhaps the court
was in error in adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity in
the first place. We do not think that is true. We believe the court
was justified in acting as it did in 1917 in view of the conditions
that then existed. The rule of stare decisis, however desirable
from the standpoint of certainty and stability, does not require
us to perpetuate a doctrine that should no longer be applicable
in view of the changes in present-day charitable hospitals. 8
Once having determined that the municipal immunity should be
abolished, the Michigan Court addressed itself to the question of who
should be affected. Justice Black's view on this issue, that although the
doctrine of municipal immunities should be abrogated, it should be
done wholly prospectively, resulted in the affirmance of the lower court
decision. Thus, the question has not been settled in Michigan conclu-
sively. However, when the same court abolished charitable immunities 9
they adopted the policy that the abrogation should be prospective, but
that it should also be applied to the case at bar, with a view toward
encouraging such pioneering efforts. Moreover, in the Williams case
four justices adhered to this view, while three, basing their decision
16 Williams v. City of Detroit, supra note 14, 111 N.W. 2d at 11.
'7 Britten v. City of Eau Claire, supra note 5, at 386, 51 N.W. 2d at 32.
18 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 133 (1961).
19 Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W. 2d 1 (1960).
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solely on stare decisis, did not address themselves to the question at all.
Wisconsin adopted the approach of the Michigan Court without ex-
tended discussion, when it considered charitable immunity in the Kojis20
case. However, it has not directed itself, when applying the new rule
to a case at bar, to the question of what weight, if any, should be given
to the reasonable expectations of municipal corporations. Such corpora-
tions may have not insured themselves, relying on the heretofore settled
doctrine of immunity. This is an additional reason for the wholly pros-
pective application of the abrogation urged by Justice Black. The ques-
tion of whether the municipal corporation had legislative authorization
to acquire liability insurance might also be raised,2 1 as, on the other
hand, might the question of the court finding an implied authorization
to purchase such insurance once the court were to remove the immunity.
The Villiams decision in Michigan may be the forerunner of the
abolition of the doctrine of municipal immunity in Wisconsin, parallel-
ing the course of charitable immunity through these same courts.
PATRICIA GODFREY
Condemnation-Public Access to Waterways: With the increas-
ing interest in the various forms of water recreation these days, the
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Branch v. Oconto County,
13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W. 2d 105 (1961), is important in the area of con-
flict which finds interests of riparian landowners and those of the
general public adverse to each other when seeking access to waters.
In this case1 the court affirmed the validity of Section 23.09(14)2 which
grants to county boards the power to condemn a right of way for a
public highway to any navigable water.
Plaintiff, landowner, had acquired a strip of land surrounding a
lake. This lake because of its shallowness and mucky bottom, offered
no opportunities for fishing or swimming, but proved to be an excel-
lent site for duck hunting. The public was restricted from use of the
lake, except upon payment of a fee to the plaintiff. The county, there-
fore, petitioned for condemnation pursuant to Section 23.09(14).
The landowner did not contest the issues of necessity or naviga-
bility, but claimed that Section 23.09(14) was unconstitutional where
duck hunting is the sole purpose to be served by the taking. He claimed
20 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, supra note 18.
21 See 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1959).
1 Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W. 2d 105 (1961).
2 WIS. STAT. §23.09(14) (1959) :
WAYS TO WATERS. The county Board of any county may condemn a right of
way for any public highway to any navigable stream, lake, or other navigable
waters. Such right of way shall not be less than sixty feet in width, and may
be condemned in the manner provided by chapter 32; but the legality or con-
stitutionality of this provision shall in nowise affect the legality or constitution-
ality of the rest of this section.
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